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“There is always some madness in love. But there is always some reason in
madness,” says Nietzsche when he talks about man’s ultimate search for authentic
love. Why are we so desperate looking for love? And why do we search for
authentic love; that is love which is not motivated by other reasons than love itself?
And can this kind of love really be found? In this paper I discuss the possibility of
authentic love in the light of Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy.
            Sartre’s whole philosophy is motivated by the question of how mankind can
realize its endless freedom. Man is endowed with unlimited freedom; but because
he interacts with others who are endowed by the same freedom and he has to deal
with certain obstacles that the environment imposes on him, this unlimited freedom
is always in danger. Man’s unlimited freedom is constantly at risk. According to
Sartre, freedom is especially at risk in the encounter with the other. In L’Être et le
Néant Sartre shows that the encounter of the other leads to alienation. The other
reveals something about me which remains a secret to me. When I recognize that
part as my being, I become dependent on the other. In Huis Clos Sartre states his
famous quotation that ‘l’enfer c’est les autres’. Sartre argues that a life is hellish
when a person becomes completely dependent for dignity on the judgment of
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others. This is also the primal reason why Sartre argues that loving relationships
are doomed to fail. Love is a concrete form of the encounter with the other and this
relation is characterized by conflict. Love is a concrete form of the object-subject
relationship which is the relationship I fall into when I encounter the other. L’Être et
le Néant is an ontology which is grounded upon consciousness which experiences
itself as a lack of being and which desires to be. Because of this desire to be,
consciousness has the tendency to possess the other and it will try to be the way
the other sees me.
 
In this paper I will show that the way in which consciousness experiences itself
leads to acts of bad faith. Sartre’s ontology in L’Être et le Néant is essentially an
account of bad faith. Based on the notes in Cahiers pour une morale, I will
reconstruct the possibility of authentic love wherein I can love the other without
harming his subjectivity or giving up my freedom.
            It’s hard to deny that Sartre’s account of love - and even his ontology about
human relationships - is rather pessimistic. It seems that harmonious or authentic
relationships with others are impossible. Every encounter with the other is a threat
to my freedom; hostile and conflictual. The encounter with the other is determined
by the gaze (le regard) of the other. Relationships are based on the way we see
the other. Le regard forms the primal obstacle in every concrete relationship and is
the reason why relationships are characterized by conflict. Although L’Être et le
Néant does not give any possibility to escape the gaze, later works of Sartre do
open some relief. Before I discuss the escape from the gaze, I will however first
discuss in detail how the gaze alienates me. Because Sartre’s whole ontology and
his ethics are based on his particular theory of the nature of human
consciousness, I will start of by setting forth Sartre’s phenomenology of human
consciousness.
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II. Consciousness and its absolute freedom
 
Sartre explains in the first chapters of L’Être et le Néant the difference between the
en-soi (a thing) and the pour-soi (human consciousness). The en-soi is
characterized by the fact that it is completely filled with being; the en-soi only is.
The pour-soi is something completely different. The nature of the pour-soi is that it
is not, which leads to the fact that the pour-soi can reflect on itself. The nature of
the pour-soi and the way it experiences itself has an effect on how we approach
others. I will first show (1) how Sartre characterizes the relationship between thetic
and non-thetic consciousness as a relationship of being. Sartre argues furthermore
(2) that this relationship of being is made possible by the fact that consciousness is
cloven. This split is experienced by consciousness (3) as a deficiency, which (4)
determines the encounter with the other.
            Sartre argues in L’Être et le Néant against Berkeley’s idealistic principles
‘esse est percipi’. The only thing that is necessary for the being of the percipere is
that there exists a “being conscious of the percipere”. The relation between thetic
consciousness (which can understand itself completely) and non-thetic
consciousness (which cannot understand all of itself) cannot be understood in
terms of reflexion. The reflecting consciousness treats that on which it reflects as
an object and is the thetic consciousness of that on which it reflects. The
relationship between the thetic and the non-thetic consciousness is a relationship
that exists at a pre-reflexive level. Because an experience exists as a mode of
being conscious of itself, Sartre concludes that the non-thetic consciousness is the
foundation for the being of the thetic consciousness. The ‘law of being conscious’
is for Sartre ‘being consciousness of something’:
 
“Toute conscience est positionnelle en ce qu’elle se transcende pour atteindre
un objet, et elle s’épuise dans cette position même: tout ce qu’il y a d’intention
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dans ma conscience actuelle est dirigé vers le dehors, vers la table; toutes mes
activités judicatives ou pratiques, toute mon affectivité du moment se
transcendent, visent la table et s’y absorbent.”[2]
 
Because the non-thetic consciousness is the source of the thetic consciousness it
follows that every experience is experience of something. Consciousness is not a
passivity, but an activity. It is the activity that directs itself towards everything that
is. As such, consciousness is pure spontaneity which is able to transcend itself and
direct itself towards something outside of it.
            The relationship between consciousness and that which it is conscious of
has a negative character. Consciousness experiences that which it is conscious as
something-which-it-is-not. When I see a house, I experience the house as
something which I am not. Sartre calls this tendency the internal negation of
consciousness. Consciousness has the capacity to distance itself from what is
presented, which implies that consciousness has the capacity to ‘sécréter un néant
qui l’isole”. Because consciousness is in its core tied to ‘nothingness’, it is
completely free. The activity of consciousness is identical to unlimited freedom.
            How does consciousness experience the néant, or the gap that exists
between consciousness and that which is presented to it? If an experience is not
identical to itself, it is what it is not. We are not the waiter that serves plates to
others, but are playing that we are a waiter. Main point is that we never can just
‘be’, as the en-soi, but are always at a distance of ourselves. The being of
consciousness is always a ‘borrowed being’ in the sense that consciousness fills
itself with being that is different from itself:
 
“La réalité-humaine, en se dépassant vers sa propre possibilité de négation, se fait
être ce par quoi la négation par dépassement vient au monde; c’est par la réalité-
humaine que le manque vient aux choses sous forme de ‘puissance’,
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‘d’inachèvement’, de ‘sursis’, de ‘potentialité’.”[3]
 
            Consciousness experiences this ‘borrowed being’ as a shortage and tries
to complement this shortage. It is not that consciousness wants to be a mere en-
soi which is ‘plain being’. The pour-soi  is not a modification of the en-soi that
desperately tries to get back to its original position. Sartre argues that the pour-soi
desires to be an en-soi-pour-soi; it wants to appropriate that which it is conscious
of. We don’t want to act as a waiter, but we want to be a waiter.
            The desire to be makes consciousness strive for something which is
doomed to fail. The desire to be is also the reason why loving relationships are
doomed to fail. When we encounter the other we try to appropriate the being which
is revealed by the other.
 
III. The encounter with the other
 
The encounter with the other is fundamentally different from the encounter with the
lifeless en-soi. When I encounter a tree, I experience myself as being-different-
then-that tree. When I encounter another human being, I experience him as a
consciousness which is not my consciousness. The difference however is that the
en-soi cannot reflect on my being, while the other human being does have the
possibility to reflect on me. And that creates the possibility of being-seen-by-the-
other (le regard). This being seen by the other arouses in me feelings of shame or
pride. In feelings of shame and pride, I realize that I’m ashamed or proud of that
which is my being. The experience of shame and pride are mediated by the
encounter with the other. Feelings of shame and pride are not only the recognition
that there is another consciousness who sees me, but also involves a recognition
that I am the way the other sees me. I accept the fact that I have become an
object:
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“La honte pure n’est pas sentiment d’être tel ou tel objet répréhensible mais, en
général, d’être un objet, c’est-à-dire de me reconnaître dans cet être dégradé,
dépendant et figé que je suis pour autrui.”[4]
 
The recognition that I am the way the other sees me, leads to a form of alienation.
The way I appear to others is knowledge that remains inaccessible to me. I can
see myself in the mirror but this will not be the same as the way I appear to others.
In feelings of shame and pride, I recognize that I am the way the other sees me,
without knowing what this being is. Because this part of my being remains
unknown for me, I am totally dependent for my being on the other:
 
“L’échappement à moi du monde, lorsqu’il est relatif et qu’il est échappement vers
l’objet-autrui, renforce l’objectivité; l’échappement à moi du monde et de moi-
même, lorsqu’il est absolu et qu’il s’opère vers une liberté qui n’est pas la mienne,
est une dissolution de ma connaissance: le monde se désintègre pour se
réintégrer là-bas en monde, mais cette désintégration ne m’est pas donnée, je ne
puis ni la connaître ni même seulement la penser.”[5]
 
Sartre says that in the encounter with the other, consciousness has to deal with the
structure of being-for-the-other. In this being-for-the-other I have become an object. For
the other, I am only the way he sees me and nothing else. Le regard is hostile to my
freedom.
            Sartre outlines in L’Être et le Néant one of the most common ways to
experience others. We tend to classify others in terms of ‘old’ or ‘young’ or ‘nice’ or
‘rude’. By classifying the other as such, we say that he is the way he is. By pinning
the other down on the way we see him, we deny that he is anything different than
the being we attribute to him. A concrete relationship of this being-for-the-other is
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the love for the other.
 
IV. The love for the other in the object-subject relationship
 
I have outlined the Sartrean nature of consciousness and its tendency to be an en-
soi-pour-soi. Consciousness has a desire to be and tries to appropriate the being
which it is conscious of. The desire to be is something which is an act of bad faith,
because consciousness tries to be something which it is not. Next I will discuss
how the desire to be makes it impossible for individuals to engage in loving
authentic relationships.
            We have seen that when I encounter the other, the other objectifies me
with his look. By the objectification of the look of the other, consciousness has the
structure of being-for-the-other. I have become dependent on the other for part of
my being. The structure of being-for-the-other makes it impossible to escape the
look of the other and to remain free. Sartre describes in L’Être et le Néant the
concrete attitudes of being-for-the-other. One of the concrete attitudes is love. In
love I want to be the way the other sees me and try to force the other to love me.
Off course, this is doomed to fail. In love I try every moment to highlight to my lover
that I am the way he sees me. I hope to impress the other so he will love me:
 
“En un mot, je m’identifie totalement à mon être-regardé pour maintenir en face de
moi la liberté regardante de l’autre et, comme mon être-objet est la seule relation
possible de moi à l’autre, c’est cet être-objet seul qui peut en servir d’instrument
pour opérer l’assimilation à moi de l’autre liberté.”[6]
 
In loving relationships, I try to be the as the other sees me and thus give up my
freedom, in order to make the other love me, which is also an act of bad faith. Love
is paradoxical because I’m assuming my being-for-the-other and try to love the
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other as a subject by deceiving him and actually denying his freedom and thus his
subjectivity. I want so desperately that the other loves me that I’m trying to seduce
him into loving me as the being which I’m not.
            The desire to be and its tumble into acts of bad faith, makes it impossible to
love the other without falling into the object-subject relationship. There is always
the question of alienation and conflict. An authentic loving relationship, wherein
one freedom loves the other as freedom without traces of alienation, is impossible
within the phenomenology of L’Être et le Néant. There is however a possibility of
escaping bad faith, which is already indicated in L’Être et le Néant.
 
V. Authenticity, the moral conversion and authentic love
 
I’ve just discussed the paradoxical relationship of love. Loving relationships are
doomed to fail because they are stuck in an object-subject scheme. I cannot love
the other without losing my freedom or without denying the freedom of my loved
one. The concrete relationships that Sartre describes in L’Être et le Néant are all
characterized by conflict and alienation. Sartre seems to be pessimistic about the
possibility of an authentic loving relationship where both lovers retain their
freedom.
            When we take L’Être et le Néant as the only ontology of human relations,
we are forced to conclude that Sartre does indeed deny the possibility of a loving
relationship that is not characterized by conflict. But this is at least a little bit odd. In
real life, Sartre had a long lasting relationship with Simone de Beauvoir. If this
relationship alienated him, why would he go on with it? Did he really want to see
his love in terms of objectification and alienation?
            I think that the answer is clearly ‘no’. Sartre wasn’t denying that love can be
authentic, but his ontology in L’Être et le Néant is an ontology of bad faith. The
desire to be that motivates consciousness prevents consciousness from being truly
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free to maintain an authentic loving relationship. When we analyze his later works,
Cahiers pour une Morale and L’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, we see a
possibility to escape the acts of bad faith. Even in L’Être et le Néant Sartre
indicates already that there is a possibility to overcome bad faith:
 
“Ces considérations n’excluent pas la possibilité d’une morale de la délivrance et
du salut. Mais celle-ci doit être atteinte au terme d’une conversion radicale dont
nous ne pouvons pas parler ici.”[7]
 
Sartre indicates here a possibility of authenticity wherein consciousness does not
lapse into bad faith. The term ‘authenticity’ is in Sartre’s work first introduced in his
notes during the second world war. Sartre notes that authenticity is reached by
despair. Despair (désespoir) is the recognition that my fundamental project cannot
be reached and that human life is pervaded by failure. Consciousness’
fundamental project is its desire to be; to become an en-soi-pour-soi. It is this
project that leads to bad faith.
            An authentic attitude towards the other is tied to the failure of being.
Authenticity becomes possible when mankind gives up his desire to be and
accepts the fact that he never is, but always has to be. This is the radical
conversion which Sartre indicates in his footnote in L’Être et le Néant.  Authenticity
means that consciousness acts according to what it is, which is nothing:
 
“La conversion: la reconnaissance de moi-même comme pour-soi ek-statique
entraîne la reconnaissance de l’esprit comme totalité détotalisée.”[8]
 
The radical - or moral - conversion has also implications for the concrete relations
to the other. The moral conversion makes it possible that I love the other without
losing my freedom or harming his subjectivity. Remember that in L’Être et le Néant,
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loving relationships are doomed to fail because I try to be the way the other sees
me and use this in order to make the other love me. In the moral conversion, I’m
giving up the desire to be, which implies that I no longer want to be the way the
other sees me. I accept the fact that I am not; that I will change every moment and
that every effort of making the other love me is doomed to fail. I do no longer
desire to be the center of attention for my lover and I am giving up my desire to be
somebody who I’m essentially not. De Beauvoir says in Pour une morale de
l’ambiguïté (1947) that when mankind loves the other in an authentic way, it means
that he loves the other as other and not as the person that needs to love me:
 
“L’aimer authentiquement, c’est l’aimer dans son altérité et dans cette liberté par
laquelle il s’échappe. L’amour est alors renoncement à toute possession, à toute
confusion; on renonce à être a fin qu’il y ait cet être qu’on n’est pas.”[9]          
 
Sartre says that in an authentic loving relationship I approach the other ‘as an
other consciousness that needs to realize its own projects’. This means that I
cannot trick the other into loving me. In authentic love, I need to accept the fact
that the other may not love me the way I love him.
            In Sartre’s ontology the pour-soi defines itself in relation to the en-soi,
which leads to an experience of deficiency. Consciousness defines itself as a lack
of being and strives therefore to be. It encounters the other from this desire to be.
When the other looks at me, he reveals something of my being which I cannot
access. The other treats me as an object and because I strive to be, I recognize
this being as part of my being. Consciousness has the structure of being-for-the-
other and looses its freedom. The relationship to the other is being characterized
by conflict and alienation because the other is not being recognized as a subject
without reducing myself to an object.
            Because the concrete relations to the other such as love are paradoxical
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and mankind falls every time into bad faith, the ontology of L’Être et le Néant calls
for deliverance. The moral conversion is the answer to this call. Due to the
conversion, consciousness experiences itself in a different way; it no longer
experiences itself as a lack of being, but accepts the fact that it is a nothing and
that I can only become. Essential for the conversion is the acceptance of the fact
that all human projects are imbued with failure. In love this means that I need to
accept the fact that I cannot force the other to love me or to see me in a certain
way. I cannot possess the other and I need to accept the fact that he has its own
projects that he needs to realize. 
            Accepting the fact that the other has his own projects is hard for us. It is
therefore unavoidable that I will sink back into the attitude of bad faith. Think of a
woman or man who fears to be left alone and tries to live up to the other’s
expectations. We try often to be a person we are not. But we also often experience
that we cannot live up to these expectations and cannot be somebody who we are
not.
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